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When this Asia Maior issue was finalized and the Covid-19 
pandemic raged throughout the world, Kian Zaccara, 
Greta Maiorano and Giulio Santi, all children of Asia 
Maior authors (Luciano Zaccara, Diego Maiorano and 
Silvia Menegazzi), were born. We (the Asia Maior editors) 
have seen that as a manifestation of Life, reasserting itself 
in front of Thanatos. It is for this reason that we dedicate 
this issue to Kian, Greta and Giulio, with the fond hope that 
they will live in a better world than the one devastated by the 
Covid-19 pandemic.
aFghanistan 2019: between peace talks and presidential elections, 
another year oF uncertainty 
Filippo Boni
The Open University
Filippo.Boni@Open.ac.uk
Afghanistan in 2019 was characterised by the Presidential elections, held on 28 
September, and whose results were announced at the end of December 2019, and by 
the peace talks between the US and the Taliban. Against such backdrop, the analy-
sis presented in this article traces the evolution of peace talks between the US and 
the Taliban during the year under examination, and accounts for the developments 
that characterised the peace process. The latter had also an important intra-Afghan 
dimension, with the Consultative Loya-Jirga, which was held between 29 April and 
3 May 2019. The socio-economic situation of Afghanistan is also analysed, with a 
specific focus on the role of women in the country’s political and economic life. With 
regards to Afghanistan’s international relations, this study dissects the geopolitical 
alignments taking place in 2019, with an assessment of the role that Russia, India, 
Pakistan and China played in the country during 2019.
1. Introduction
During the year 2019, Afghanistan’s political developments were 
characterised primarily by three major processes. The first was peace ne-
gotiations between the US and the Taliban, which saw an acceleration and 
then an abrupt halt in early September, only to be restarted towards the end 
of the year. The second was the Consultative Loya Jirga, an intra-Afghan 
process aimed at providing a framework for negotiations with the Taliban, 
which saw the participation of 3,200 delegates from across the country, and 
a relatively fair representation of women. Third was the Presidential elec-
tion, held on 28th September after repeated postponements, whose results 
were announced on 22 December 2019, and from which Ashraf Ghani 
emerged with a thin majority of votes. 
While on the domestic front «uncertainty» was a key word in defining 
the country’s political landscape, as far as the geopolitics of Afghanistan 
are concerned, the year 2019 registered the continued involvement of key 
regional partners, Russia, India, China and Pakistan above all, in trying to 
shape the political trajectory in Kabul for the years to come. 
In order to analyse these developments in greater depth, section 2 of 
the article dissects the dynamics characterising the Presidential elections, 
both in the run-up and in the immediate aftermath, as well as the main con-
troversies surrounding the announcement of results. The ensuing section 3 
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provides an assessment of the US-Taliban peace talks, tracing the evolution 
of the latter during 2019, as well as of the Consultative Loya Jirga. Section 4 
of the article outlines the economic situation in Afghanistan, and also pro-
vides an overview of the role of women in the country’s political life during 
the year under examination. Finally, section 5 focuses on the positioning of 
Russia, India, Pakistan and China about the future of Afghanistan. 
2. The 2019 Presidential Elections: Ghani’s victory, amid delays and low turnout
Presidential elections were held on 28 September 2019 for the fourth 
time since the Taliban were ousted in 2001 (the previous ones were in 2004, 
2009 and 2014). The results, originally to be announced in their preliminary 
form on 18 October, and then officially on 7 November, were postponed to 
14 November and then eventually made public on 22 December 2019. This 
was somewhat in line with the unfolding of post-election dynamics in 2018, 
with the official results of the Parliamentary elections only announced 7 
months later, on 14 May 2019, after the counting of the votes in Kabul were 
finally released and confirmed.1 Fifteen Candidates contested the Presiden-
tial elections, including the incumbent President, Ashraf Ghani, and the 
incumbent Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah, but there were no women 
candidates to the Presidency. However, as each candidate entered the race 
on tickets that included first and second running mates, three women were 
included in the tickets of three different candidates.2
According to the preliminary results announced by the Independent 
Elections Commission (IEC), with 50.64% (934,868 votes) of the total votes 
casted, President Ashraf Ghani was the one who emerged as the leading can-
didate after this electoral round. Abdullah Abdullah followed with 39.52% 
(720,099 votes) and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar with 3.85% (70,243 votes).3 In 
celebrating the results, President Ghani praised the Afghan Republic and 
its citizens: «The republic is firm in its place. The republic (government) 
will continue and citizens will be its center. Today is the citizens’ celebration. 
1.  ‘Final Results Of Last Year’s General Elections In Kabul Announced’, Radi-
oFreeEurope, 15 May 2019. For the full elections results, see: Independent Election 
Commission, ‘2018 Afghanistan Wolesi Jirga Elections’ (http://www.iec.org.af/results/
en/home).  
2.  These were: Massuda Jalal, running mate of Rahmatullah Nabil; Farida 
Mohmand, running mate of Ahmad Wali Massud; and Khadija Ghaznawi, included in 
Mohammad Ibrahim Alekozai’s ticket. Frud Bezhan, ‘Who’s Who Among The Afghan 
Presidential Candidates’, RadioFreeEurope, 27 September 2019. In 2004, 2009, and 
2014 there was at least one woman candidate in the Presidential elections, although 
in 2014 she was disqualified before the poll. See: Ali Yawar Adili, ‘Afghanistan’s 2019 
elections (2): Who is running to become the next president?’, Afghanistan Analysts 
Network, 11 February 2019. 
3.  ‘Ghani Tops Preliminary Election Results: IEC’, Tolo News, 22 December 2019. 
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The people of Afghanistan made this success happen.»4 On its part, the run-
ner up Abdullah Abdullah, did not concede and claimed that «no doubt, we 
are the winning team based on the people’s clean votes. The Stability and 
Convergence is the winning team in this election», also adding that some 
«fraudulent» votes «were added» to the total number in Ghani’s favour.5 Be-
fore results were announced, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 
had conducted a partial vote recount to address concerns from the election 
teams about frauds in the electoral process, but this did not stop Abdullah 
to file an appeal against the results. It is important to bear in mind that, ac-
cording to the Afghan constitution, if no candidate achieves a majority (and 
this could happen if enough complaints are validated), a second round is 
required between the two most voted candidates in the first round, which is 
what happened in 2014 with Ghani and Abdullah. However, winter weather 
conditions make large parts of the country difficult to reach, and this may 
lead to a delay in the Presidential runoff until spring 2020, which is likely to 
exacerbate political uncertainty.6
Turnout for this Presidential election was at historic low, with the IEC 
revising its figure downwards from the initial 2.7 million voters to 1.8 million 
towards the end of November, out of a total of more than 9 million registered 
voters.7 If this latter figure was to be confirmed, this would amount to nearly 
20% of registered voters, and it would have clear implications on the legiti-
macy of the results, given that only 1 in 5 Afghans casted their ballot. 
Table 1 – Turnout in Afghanistan Presidential Election 2004-2019
Year Registered Voters Votes casted Turnout (%)
2004 10,567,834 8,128,940 69 %
2009 ~ 16,000,000 4,823,090 ~ 30%
2014 20,845,988 6,604,546 31.6 %
2019 9,665,745 1,823,948 18.8 %
Source: author’s own calculations of data from multiple sources.8 
4.  ‘Ghani: «Today a Republic Was Ensured»’, Tolo News, 22 December 2019. 
5.  ‘Abdullah Says His Team is the «Winner» Based on «Clean» Votes’, Tolo News, 
22 December 2019. The Stability and Convergence team was the campaign team led 
by Chief Executive and Presidential Candidate Abdullah Abdullah.
6.  Clayton Thomas, ‘Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief ’, Con-
gressional Research Service, R45122, Updated 5 December 2019. 
7.  ‘Abdullah Blasts IEC for «Ignoring» Candidates’ Demands’, Tolo News, 17 
November 2019. 
8.  See: Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Presi-
dential Election Result – 2004, ‘Turnout by Province’; European Union Democracy 
And Election Support Mission, ‘Afghanistan. Presidential Election 9 October 2004’, 
Final Report. Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan, ‘Final Certified Presi-
dential Results by Vote Order’. There are no exact figures on registered voters in 2009, 
hence the rough estimates based on reported turnout by UNAMA. Independent Elec-
tion Commission of Afghanistan, ‘Presidential Elections Final Results’, 15 May 2014. 
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Some observers noted that three main factors, namely uncertainty, 
election fatigue, and threat from the Taliban, may explain the low turnout: 
first, uncertainty has dominated the run-up to the elections, since up until 
the week before 28 September, it was unclear when the elections were go-
ing to be held; second, election fatigue, with these elections coming a lit-
tle more than one year after the 2018 parliamentary ones and whose final 
results were announced only four months before the Presidential elections; 
third, the threat from the Taliban who, as they have made clear over the 
years, considered the elections a farce.9 The latter point is of particular im-
portance, especially if put in comparison with the dynamics preceding the 
2018 Parliamentary elections. According to data from the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), civilian casualties «were sig-
nificantly lower in 2019 as compared to the 2018 parliamentary elections – 
both in the lead up to election day and on polling day.»10 At the same time, 
it is important to note how the Taliban were able to carry out two symbolic 
attacks, one in Charikar and one at the Massud roundabout in Kabul, in the 
weeks preceding the 2019 elections. The aim was to continue the Taliban’s 
fight against the government in Kabul as well as to send a signal to the US, 
given that the Massud Roundabout is very close to the US Embassy in Ka-
bul.11 This episode of pre-election violence, considerably worsened the situ-
ation concerning the peace negotiations between the US and the Taliban, 
that are analysed in the ensuing section.   
3. Peace talks: The Consultative Loya Jirga and the US-Taliban negotiations
Low turnout and uncertainty, with the resulting lack of trust in elect-
ed representatives, besides hindering the prospects of democratic gov-
ernance in Afghanistan, have eroded public trust in constitutional and 
democratic processes, at a time in which the Afghan government needed 
to be seen as a credible interlocutor in the ongoing peace talks between 
the United States and the Taliban. 2019 was a year which saw a great 
acceleration in the negotiation between March and early September, an 
abrupt stall between September and November, and the resumption of 
talks in December. 
In March 2019, after almost one year of constant interactions with 
the Afghan Taliban delegation, the Afghan government and regional part-
9.  Srinjoy Bose & Nishank Motwani, ‘Afghan elections: Impressions from poll-
ing day’, The Interpreter, 10 October 2019. 
10.  United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Afghanistan. Protection 
Of Civilians In Armed Conflict. Special Report: 2019 Election-Related Violence, Kabul, Oc-
tober 2019.
11.  ‘Taliban suicide attacks kill at least 48 before Afghan elections’, Al Jazeera, 
17 Sept 2019
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ners, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Ambas-
sador Zalmay Khalilzad, announced that the two sides had agreed on a draft 
agreement and that once the agreement was going to be finalised, «the Tali-
ban and other Afghans, including the government, will begin intra-Afghan 
negotiations on a political settlement and comprehensive ceasefire».12 As 
the eyes of the world were on the talks between the Taliban and the US 
government, an important intra-Afghan process began in parallel in the 
spring of 2019. Between 29 April and 3 May of the same year, President 
Ghani convened a consultative Loya Jirga – the sixth since 2001 – aimed at 
seeking views on, and discussing a framework for, peace negotiations with 
the Taliban.13 The Jirga consisted of 3,200 delegates, out of which 30% were 
women, who featured well also in the administrative boards of the Jirga, 
where four out of ten members were women, as well as in the various com-
mittees in which the Jirga was divided, with 13 heads and 28 secretaries of 
the fifty committees being women.14 The delegates taking part in this Jirga 
were asked to consider four questions: 
1) how can we convince the Taliban to participate in [an intra-Afghan] 
negotiation? 
2) What are the values and achievements that the Afghan government 
should not compromise on? 
3) What are your views on the make-up of the Afghan delegation 
for peace? 
4) How should the Afghan government deal with the neighbouring 
countries, especially the country which is financially supporting the Taliban 
and providing them weapons?15 
Each of these groups reported back and the results were condensed 
into a 23-point communiqué, which reflected the road map of the govern-
ment on the peace process with the Taliban.16 Analysts observed that the 
communiqué reflected some of the views from the Palace, but most of the 
participants agreed that the final result was also a fair representation of 
the views expressed during the days of discussion.17 In a nutshell, some of 
the main recommendations included placing the government at the centre 
12.  Clayton Thomas, ‘Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief ’, Con-
gressional Research Service, R45122, Updated 5 December.
13.  Jelena Bjelica & Thomas Ruttig, ‘AAN Q&A: Between «Peace Talks» and 
Elections – The 2019 Consultative Peace Loya Jirga’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 26 
April 2019.
14.  Kate Clark, Ehsan Qaane & Ali Yawar Adili, ‘The End of the Jirga: Strong 
Words and Not Much Controversy’, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 3 May 2019.  
15.  Ibid.
16.  Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Canberra, Australia, 
‘Communique - The Consultative Peace Loya Jirga 2019’, 14 May 2019. 
17.  Scott Smith, ‘Loya Jirgas and Political Crisis Management in Afghanistan: 
Drawing on the Bank of Tradition’, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report N. 
457, September 2019.
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of any peace talks, calling for a ceasefire, the need for an end to interfer-
ence by (unspecified) neighbours, the prospect of the withdrawal of foreign 
troops, as well as the protection of women’s rights, a theme which is dis-
cussed in greater detail in Section 4 of this article.18
While the Loya-Jirga had set a framework for the intra-Afghan com-
ponent of the process, towards the end of August 2019, the negotiations 
between the US and the Taliban were on course for being concluded after 
nine rounds of talks, with a number of media outlets reporting some of the 
details of the agreement. In particular, in an interview with «TOLO News», 
the US Special Representative said that the two sides had «reached an agree-
ment in principle» for a phased out deal, which would include the following 
points: a) the US would withdraw 5,000 troops in 135 days, provided the 
Taliban were going to scale down violence in Kabul and Parwan; b) the US 
would withdraw the rest of its troops by the end of 2020.19 In exchange, the 
Taliban would «bar al-Qaeda from activities such as fundraising, recruiting, 
training and operational planning in areas under Taliban control».20 In ad-
dition, US officials were expecting that the ensuing step would have been 
the Taliban-Afghan government direct negotiations.21 
Critics of the agreement in Washington had warned against a with-
drawal, invoking President’s Obama decision to withdraw troops from Iraq 
as one of the reasons behind the emergence of the Islamic State.22 In a simi-
lar fashion, nine former US diplomatic officials wrote an article for «The 
Atlantic», in which they argued that «a major withdrawal of US forces should 
follow, not come in advance of real peace agreement» and that «a funda-
mental mistake of the Obama administration was the constant repetition of 
dates for departure. This encouraged the Taliban to fight on and undercut 
confidence among friendly Afghans».23 They concluded that «it is critical 
that the United States make clear that full withdrawal will not occur on 
fixed dates but will, on the contrary, require conclusion of a real and clearly 
defined peace».24
18.  Clark, Qaane & Adili, ‘The End of the Jirga’, 3 May 2019.
19.  ‘US And Taliban Reach Agreement In Principle: Khalilzad’, Tolo News, 2 
September 2019. 
20.  Karen DeYoung, Missy Ryan, Anne Gearan & Philip Rucker, ‘Trump and 
senior aides discuss withdrawal from Afghanistan as talks with Taliban advance’, The 
Washington Post, 16 August 2019. 
21.  Ibid. 
22.  Michael Crowley, Lara Jakes & Mujib Mashal, ‘Trump Says He’s Called 
Off Negotiations With Taliban After Afghanistan Bombing’, New York Times, 8 Sep-
tember 2019.
23.  James Dobbins, Robert P. Finn, Ronald E. Neumann, William Wood, John 
Negroponte, Earl Anthony Wayne, Ryan Crocker, James Cunningham, & Hugo Llo-
rens, ‘US-Taliban Negotiations: How to Avoid Rushing to Failure’, Atlantic Council, 3 
September 2019.
24.  Ibid.
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This process was ended by President Trump himself following an at-
tack by the Taliban in Kabul, which killed a number of people including a 
US soldier. The announcement came in a series of tweets, in which the US 
President disclosed that he had arranged to meet both the Taliban leaders 
and the Afghan President Ghani at Camp David, but that he called off the 
meeting as a result of this attack, questioning the Taliban’s willingness to 
enter the ceasefire.25 After nearly three months, in another coup-de-thea-
tre, Trump visited Afghanistan on Thanksgiving day, ostensibly to support 
American troops on that day, but clearly with an eye to re-opening negotia-
tions with the Taliban. In what was Trump’s first visit to the country since 
he became president, not only he declared that peace talks with the Taliban 
were reopened, but he also invited Afghan President Ghani to officially visit 
Washington.26 The visit was important since it came at a time when President 
Trump was looking for a foreign policy achievement, to be presented as a 
success story in the election campaign for the 2020 Presidential elections.27 
On 18 December 2019, while on a two-day visit to Afghanistan, US 
Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad 
stated that peace talks have reached an «important stage», after meeting 
among others, with President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah.28 
4. The socio-economic conditions 
The domestic dynamics discussed in the previous sections of this ar-
ticle are inextricably intertwined also with Afghanistan’s 2019 economic 
outlook. According to the World Bank, «without […] an improved security 
situation, growth is likely to remain slow with limited progress in reducing 
poverty from current very high levels.» The World Bank has also mentioned 
the uncertain outcome of the presidential elections and peace negotiations 
with the Taliban as reasons behind low business and investor confidence.29 
According to the Asian Development Outlook 2019, Afghanistan’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate is set at 2.7% in 2019, up from 
the 2.5% projection in April of the same year.30 According to the report, fa-
vourable weather conditions allowed agriculture to recover from last year’s 
25.  Donald J. Trump, Tweet, 7 September 2019, 11:51pm. 
26.  Zachary Cohen, ‘President Trump announces Taliban talks have restarted 
on surprise Afghanistan visit’, CNN, 28 November 2019. 
27.  Michael Crowley, ‘Trump Visits Afghanistan and Says He Reopened Talks 
With Taliban’, The New York Times, 28 November 2019. 
28.  ‘US-Taliban Afghan peace talks at «important stage»: Khalilzad’, Al-Jazeera, 
19 December 2019.
29.  The World Bank, Afghanistan Overview, 13 October 2019.
30.  Asian Development Bank, Afghanistan’s Economic Growth Improves Slightly in 
2019 Amid Challenges, 26 September 2019. 
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drought stronger than expected. As a result, with a rising agricultural pro-
duction, the forecast predicts an upturn in household income which will 
eventually support growth in private consumption.31 Alongside an increased 
agricultural production, exports also increased by 2.1% in the first half of 
the year, and imports have declined by 7.7%, compared with the same pe-
riod in 2018. Finally, inflation in 2019 is now expected to be 2.0%, lower 
than the earlier forecasted 3.0%.32
In addition to these economic indicators, it is important to assess 
women’s participation in the economic and political life of Afghanistan dur-
ing the year under examination. One of the national development priorities 
that the Afghan government has set since 2016, in collaboration with the 
World Bank, has been the economic empowerment of women. By estab-
lishing the Women’s Economic Empowerment National Priority Program 
(WEE-NPP), the Afghan government aims at removing obstacles and con-
straints to women’s active participation in the economy. The WEE-NPP is 
part of the Afghan government’s Gender Strategy, which is included in the 
wider Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF), 
the country’s five-year development plan for the period 2017-2021. A look 
at the role of women in Afghanistan’s political landscape, provides some 
important insights into the way in which a proactive role of women in the 
Afghan society is being encouraged. 
As previously noted, there were no women candidates in the 2019 
Presidential elections. However, the 2018 parliamentary elections registered 
an important milestone with regards to the role of women in the Afghan 
Parliament. 68 women were elected out of 244 seats available, and nearly 
one third of the available seats is now occupied by women.33 With Afghani-
stan ranking 57th in world for number of women in parliament, ahead for 
instance of the United States, it is not just the number of women in Par-
liament which has improved, but also the fact that women have been ap-
pointed to key positions. Ambassador Adela Raz is a case in point. She is 
Afghanistan’s first female permanent representative to the United Nations, 
and she has started a U.N. group to protect the rights Afghan women have 
gained since 2001.34 Similarly, Roya Rahmani was appointed in December 
2018 as the first female ambassador to the United States, and in an inter-
view with «France 24» in August 2019, she argued that «women inclusion is 
a matter of national security for us […]; peace will not be possible if women 
are not included in a meaningful way.»35 
31.  Ibid.
32.  Ibid.
33.  Inter-Parliamentary Union, ‘Percentage of women in national parliaments’ 
(https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=9&year=2019). 
34.  ‘Afghan Woman Ambassador Forms Group to Help Afghan Women’, The 
Associated Press, 19 November 2019.
35.  ‘Taliban «must accept the Afghanistan of 2019», says Afghan ambassador to 
US’, France 24, 28 August 2019. 
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Besides the above data, concerning top level appointments, others 
must be quoted. Roughly 3.5 million girls out of 9 million children are now 
enrolled in schools.36 However, according to data released in 2019 by Af-
ghanistan’s newly formed National Statistics and Information Authority 
(NSIA) about the number of female students and teachers in Government 
Higher Education Universities, there are only 816 female teachers, out of 
a total number of 5,876. In terms of students, the figure is slightly more 
positive, with 49,071 female students out of 186,025 students in total. Over-
all, the number of universities increased from 19 in 2002 to 38 in 2018.37 
If we turn to the number of governmental employees, 86,919 are women 
out of 404,151 in total, recording the lowest number of women employed 
by the government since 2013, although the overall number of employees 
increased of 16,000 units during the 2013-2018 period.38
A final aspect that it is important to discuss in this cursory survey of 
Afghanistan’s economic situation is the state of narcotics in the country. As 
of December 2019, the annual report produced by the United Nations Of-
fice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Ministry of Counter Narcotics 
has not yet been published.39 However, the chief of UNODC, Yury Fedotov, 
reported that opium poppy cultivation is expected to show a decrease from 
the record high levels in 2017 and 2018.40
5. Afghanistan’s international relations 
While the United States were certainly the most prominent actor in 
Afghanistan’s peace process, a number of other regional countries have con-
tinued being involved, to varying extents, in having a say on the country’s 
future. Bearing in mind the fluid nature of the regional alignments that 
took place regarding the future of Afghanistan, this section provides a sur-
vey of the geopolitical positioning that each of the major players took in 
2019. These include Russia, India, Pakistan and China, which all have a 
stake in having a politically stable and economically thriving Afghanistan in 
the years to come. However, all these countries have positioned themselves 
36.  USAID, Afghanistan (https://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/education).
37.  National Statistics and Information Authority, ‘Number of Government 
Higher Education Universities, Students and Teachers by Sex 2002 – 2018’ (https://
nsia.gov.af/services). 
38.  National Statistics and Information Authority, ‘No. of Governmental Em-
ployees by Ministry، Independent Organizations and Sex in the Year 2004 – 2018’, 
(https://nsia.gov.af/services).
39.  From 2019, the report will be produced by Afghanistan’s National Statistics 
and Information Authority in collaboration with UNDOC.
40.  United Nations Information Centre, ‘Un Afghanistan Envoy Briefs Security 
Council’, 10 September 2019. 
Filippo Boni
444
by throwing their weight behind different actors, who are all competing for 
a stake in the future political settlement of Afghanistan.
5.1. Russia and India in Afghanistan
 Russia has been cultivating its ties with the Taliban over the past few 
years, in particular since 2016, under the strategic steering of Zamir Kabu-
lov, President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy to Afghanistan. As Ankit Panda 
and Srinjoy Bose have noted, Kabulov has been at the centre of two impor-
tant shifts in Russia’s policy towards Afghanistan, the first being a greater 
engagement between Moscow and the Taliban, and the second represented 
by Russia supporting a strong Pakistani role in Afghanistan.41 The events of 
2019, which marks the 30th anniversary of the Red Army’s withdrawal from 
Kabul, were in line with the two trends just outlined. In early February 2019, 
Russia hosted peace talks between the Taliban and Senior Afghan politi-
cians, a meeting which excluded the US-backed Afghan government, and 
which was thereby criticised by Afghan foreign ministry spokesman Sebghat 
Ahmadi, who defined the negotiations backed by Moscow as unhelpful to 
the peace process, also adding that they were «little more than a politi-
cal drama».42 According to the Afghan government, the Kremlin-supported 
gathering was aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the government in 
Kabul, as the delegates present there were not representative of Afghani-
stan’s institutions.43 This instance demonstrates Russia’s approach to the 
peace talks in Afghanistan. Moscow’s concerns that a deteriorating relation-
ship with the Afghan government could lead to its (Moscow’s) diplomatic 
isolation, have translated into an attempt at subverting President Ghani’s 
authority «by throwing its weight behind opposition figures and strengthen-
ing its relationship with the Taliban».44   
On the opposite end of the spectrum to Russia, India has advocat-
ed for giving centre stage to the elected government in Afghanistan, when 
it comes to deciding the country’s future. Soon after US President Trump 
called off talks with the Taliban, Raveesh Kumar, the spokesperson for the 
Ministry of External Affairs, said that India believes «that all the section of 
the Afghan society including the legitimately elected government should be 
41.  Ankit Panda & Srinjoy Bose, ‘The Conflict in Afghanistan: Interlocking 
Strategic Challenges as a Barrier to Regional Solution’, in Takashi Inoguchi (ed.), The 
SAGE Handbook of Asian Foreign Policy, London: SAGE Publication, November 2019, 
pp. 361-368. 
42.  Mujib Mashal, ‘Taliban to Meet Afghan Politicians (but Not Ghani) in Mos-
cow’, The New York Times, 2 February 2019. 
43.  Andrew Higgins & Mujib Mashal, ‘In Moscow, Afghan Peace Talks Without 
the Afghan Government’, The New York Times, 4 February 2019. 
44.  Samuel Ramani, ‘In the Demise of the Taliban Peace Talks, Russia Is the 
Winner’, Foreign Policy, 11 September 2019.  
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part of the process».45 While India’s position has been relatively consistent, 
throughout 2019, there have been calls from within India to engage with 
the Taliban. In particular, during his annual press conference in January 
2019, the then Chief of the Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat, advocated 
for an engagement with the Taliban. In his words, «a number of countries 
are talking to this group [the Taliban], do we have interest in Afghanistan is 
the first issue. Does India have interest in Afghanistan. If the answer is yes 
then you cannot be out of the bandwagon».46 However, New Delhi has reit-
erated his position in support of elected representatives in Kabul and for an 
«inclusive» Afghan peace process. The main driver of India’s policy in Af-
ghanistan «is to ensure a continuing strategic balance between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan; […] this means that India wants to ensure that Pakistan does 
not manipulate the terms of peace talks and undermine Indian interests in 
Afghanistan».47 The way in which Pakistan has sought a role in Afghanistan 
during 2019, is discussed in the ensuing section of the article.
5.2. Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2019: charting a new course?
There are two aspects concerning Pakistan’s role in the international 
relations of Afghanistan that are key to understand developments occurred 
in 2019: first, the evolution of the relations between Islamabad and Kabul, 
characterised by tensions in the first part of year and by the potential for 
a fresh start from June onwards; second, Pakistan’s centrality in the US-
Taliban peace negotiations. 
With regards to the bilateral ties between the two countries, in March 
2019, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, reportedly said that the 
Afghan government was «a hurdle in [the] peace process that was insisting 
that Taliban should talk to it» and that establishing an interim government 
would have made the peace efforts easier.48 The push back from Afghanistan 
was strong, with foreign affairs ministry spokesman Sibghatullah Ahmadi, 
claiming that the statement was «an obvious example of Pakistan’s interven-
tional policy and disrespect to the national sovereignty and determination of 
the people of Afghanistan».49 In addition, the Afghan government recalled 
its Ambassador to Pakistan. Tensions somewhat diffused in early May, when 
Prime Minister Imran Khan invited President Ashraf Ghani to visit Paki-
stan. Interestingly, especially to understand where the locus of power lies 
45.  ‘India closely following developments in Afghanistan: MEA’, Business Stand-
ard, 12 September 2019. 
46.  ‘No change in India’s position on Afghanistan, it supports «inclusive» peace 
process: MEA’, The Economic Times, 11 January 2019. 
47.  Avinash Paliwal, ‘The «India Question» in Afghanistan’, Lawfare Blog, 6 
October 2019.
48.  ‘Afghanistan recalls ambassador in row over Pakistan PM remarks’, Reuters, 
26 March 2019.
49.  Ibid.
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within Pakistan when it comes to Afghanistan, the groundwork for the visit 
was laid by a meeting in Rawalpindi, at the end of May, between, on the 
one hand, a high-powered Afghan delegation, including the Afghan Interior 
Minister and Hamdullah Mohib, the Afghan national security adviser, and, 
on the other, senior Pakistani military and intelligence officials, including 
the Army Chief, General Bajwa, and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, Mr. So-
hail Mahmood.50 President Ghani’s visit to Pakistan occurred on 27-28 June 
2019, and it came after a hiatus of 5 years. During the visit, the two sides 
agreed to «open a new chapter of friendship and cooperation between Paki-
stan and Afghanistan» and the Pakistani Prime Minister reiterated his coun-
try’s commitment «to bring about a qualitative transformation in Pakistan-
Afghanistan relations as part of his vision of a ‘peaceful neighbourhood’».51 
While the visit certainly represented a positive development in the 
often tense bilateral relations between the two countries, a similar enthu-
siasm accompanied President Ghani’s first visit to Pakistan in November 
2014. According to a Pakistani diplomat interviewed by «The Guardian» at 
the time of the first visit, «there is a real desire among both the military and 
civilians to start a new chapter with Ghani».52 The history of the past five 
years, characterised more by tensions than cooperation, demonstrates how 
claims of new beginnings should be treated with caution.   
The second dimension around which Afghanistan’s relations with Pa-
kistan have evolved in 2019 is the role that Islamabad has had as a key in-
terlocutor and mediator in the peace talks between the US and the Taliban. 
During Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to the US in July 2019, President 
Trump was hopeful that Pakistan was «going to help us [the US] out to ex-
tricate ourselves [from Afghanistan]». The American President also said «I 
think Pakistan will save millions of lives in Afghanistan. As of this moment, 
they are working very hard».53 Earlier that month, the US had designated 
the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a terrorist organisation, a long-
standing request from Pakistan and, as observers noted, it may have come in 
exchange for Pakistan’s support in the Afghan peace process.54 
The substantiation of Pakistan’s role in the latter came in October 
2019, following the abrupt halt to the talks in early September 2019, and it 
enabled the parties to return to the negotiating table. Two rounds of talks 
50.  ‘Afghan security czar visits Pakistan to remove irritants in ties’, The Express 
Tribune, 29 May 2019; Tahir Khan, ‘Afghan NSA, interior minister hold talks with 
senior Pakistani officials’, Daily Times, 29 May 2019.
51.  ‘PM Imran, Afghan President Ghani look to «opening new chapter of 
friendship»’, Dawn, 27 June 2019. 
52.  Jonathan Boone, ‘Ashraf Ghani visit may mark new chapter in Afghan-
Pakistan relations’, The Guardian, 14 November 2014. 
53.  Michael D. Shear & Salman Masood, ‘Trump Tries Cooling Tensions With 
Pakistan to Speed Afghan Peace Talks’, The New York Times, 22 July 2019.
54.   ‘U.S. Designates Pakistan’s Balochistan Liberation Army As Terrorist 
Group’, RadioFreeEurope, 3 July 2019.
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were held in Islamabad between the Afghan Taliban delegation, led by Mul-
lah Baradar, co-founder of the Taliban movement and Chief of the group’s 
diplomatic office in Doha, and Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. As reported 
by «The Express Tribune», a senior Pakistani official observed that Pakistan 
«has been pressing the Taliban to agree to a ceasefire or at least give a com-
mitment for reducing the level of violence.»55 With the talks resuming in 
December 2019, as the previous parts of the article already discussed, it 
becomes clear how Pakistan’s role in the peace process was a key one. 
5.3. China in Afghanistan: multilateralism and mediation
Another key player in the international relations of Afghanistan dur-
ing the year under examination is China. Beijing’s interest in Afghanistan 
has primarily revolved around security considerations as well as economic 
engagement with the country. The statement released after the meeting 
between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Afghan counterpart Ashraf 
Ghani in June 2019, during the SCO meeting in Bishkek, epitomises the 
security-economy nexus driving Beijing’s engagement with Kabul. Accord-
ing to a Xinhua report, Xi Jinping «called on the Afghan side to continue to 
firmly support China in its fight against the terrorist force of East Turkistan 
Islamic Movement (ETIM)» while simultaneously reaffirming China’s com-
mitment to strengthen and deepen cooperation with Afghanistan within the 
BRI framework, and to «steadily promote practical cooperation in economy 
and trade».56 With these drivers in mind, and similarly to what we have seen 
in 2018, China’s policy in Afghanistan has been characterised by two direc-
tives. On the one hand, there is a multilateral approach, aimed at discuss-
ing about present and future Afghan dynamics in a number of multilateral 
fora.57 On the other hand, there is the willingness to act as a mediator in the 
Afghan peace process. 
On the first aspect, throughout 2019, Afghanistan has been increas-
ingly involved in a number of China-sponsored multilateral organisations 
and consultation mechanisms. As the Chinese Ambassador to Afghani-
stan, Wang Yu, stated in November 2019, «China admittedly has limited 
strength. We have therefore actively increased cooperation with other 
members of the world community to jointly help Afghanistan.»58 The year 
55.  Kamran Yousaf, ‘Pakistan in push to revive Afghan peace process’, The Ex-
press Tribune, 20 October 2019.
56.  ‘Chinese, Afghan presidents pledge joint efforts to promote ties’, Xinhua 
News, 14 June 2019.
57.  For a discussion of China’s Afghan policy in 2018, see: Filippo Boni, ‘Af-
ghanistan 2018: Parliamentary elections and regional power shifts’, Asia Maior, Vol. 
XXIX, pp. 377-392.
58.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, H.E. Wang 
Yu, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Afghanistan, Chinese Contribution 
to Afghanistan Obvious to All, 28 November 2019.
Filippo Boni
448
2019 was a case in point. In April, Afghanistan chaired for the first time a 
meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Afghanistan Contact 
Group, which was held in Bishkek.59 Participants discussed about progress 
on the Afghan peace process and reviewed the Contact Group’s draft road 
map for further action.60 In September, Afghanistan participated in the 
third Afghanistan-China-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue, in Islama-
bad.61 During the meeting, the three sides «agreed on a list of initial pro-
jects of enhancing counterterrorism cooperation» as well as to continue to 
build political mutual trust and support reconciliation efforts.62 They also 
agreed to explore «China-Afghanistan-Pakistan plus» cooperation. Finally, 
at the beginning of November, Afghanistan participated as an observer in 
the 18th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Heads of 
Governments, in Uzbekistan. 
With regards to China’s role in the Afghan peace process, accord-
ing to Raffaello Pantucci «Beijing has clearly concluded that the road to 
resolution in Afghanistan includes bringing the Taliban to the table».63 This 
trend was set in motion in previous years, during which China reportedly 
met several times with Taliban representatives, to discuss about the peace 
process in Afghanistan.64 The developments in 2019 confirm this wider 
trend of engaging directly with the Taliban. In June 2019, the «South China 
Morning Post» reported about a meeting between Taliban representatives 
and Chinese authorities which had occurred in an unspecified date earlier 
that month, and in which the two sides discussed the US withdrawal «in 
exchange for guarantees that Afghanistan will not be used as a base for mili-
tant attacks».65 In September 2019, after US President Trump had called 
off the peace negotiations, Suhail Shaheen, a spokesman for the Afghan 
Taliban, said that a nine-member Taliban delegation travelled to Beijing 
and met with Deng Xijun, China’s special representative for Afghanistan, to 
59.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Shanghai Co-
operation Organization’s Contact Group Meeting on Afghanistan Kicks Off’, 19 April 2019. 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization-Afghanistan Contact Group, was originally 
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counterterrorism cooperation’, Dawn, 7 September 2019.
62.  Ibid.
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stan and the Taliban?’, South China Morning Post, 10 February 2019.
64.  Farhan Bokhari, Kiran Stacey & Emily Feng, ‘China courted Afghan Tali-
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discuss about the suspension of peace talks with the US.66 Finally, on 28 Oc-
tober 2019, a Taliban delegation met in China for two days with representa-
tives of the Afghan government, for two days of intra-Afghan peace talks.67 
This final meeting came in the wake of another meeting held in Moscow a 
few days earlier, on 25 October, in which the US, Russia, China and Pakistan 
issued a joint statement, calling for a ceasefire, for the release of prisoners 
(both from the Afghan government and the Taliban), and for the start of 
intra-Afghan dialogue.68
6. Conclusion
As the analysis presented above demonstrated, Afghanistan in 2019 
was a country in flux, with a high degree of political and economic uncer-
tainty looming large on the country’s future. On the domestic front, while 
the announcement of preliminary results, even if delayed, strengthened the 
credibility of the electoral process, allegations of voting frauds, coupled with 
low voter turnout, may undermine the legitimacy of the new president, at a 
time in which peace talks would require unity among political forces. You-
suf Rasheed, the executive director of the Free and Fair Election forum for 
Afghanistan, noted how «there is a great lack of public confidence in the 
political environment. If the opponents start putting on pressure and more 
protests now, it will not be helpful or improve the process.»69
  Internationally, very much like in previous years, 2019 was domi-
nated by the US and their peace negotiations with the Taliban. At the same 
time, an array of actors, including Russia, Pakistan, China and India, vied 
to position themselves in the international relations of Afghanistan, by sup-
porting key political actors, who were likely to have a stake in the future po-
litical framework of the country. Interestingly, China, Russia and Pakistan, 
all three have engaged to varying degrees with the Taliban and are trying to 
accommodate them as legitimate interlocutors in the intra-Afghan equilib-
rium that will emerge in the coming years.   
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